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THE SLEEPING GIANT OF RIGHTS: 
SECTION 7 AND SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
KATHLEEN MCMANUSt 
Section 7 of the Charter has given the courts the powerful tool of substantive 
review. This instrument allows the courts to go beyond procedural review to 
examine the merits of legislation. This ability to intrude on what has been 
regarded as the exclusive jurisdiction of legislatures has attracted powerful 
critics. The courts have ignored some opponents and have used substantive 
reviews. The steps have been tentative but important. If the courts continue 
to use and indeed broaden substantive review, then section 7 will be the 
source of new rights which will enable Canada to become a society of truly 
meaningful equality. 
L 'article 7 de la Charte procure aux cours de justice un puissant instrument 
en matiere de revision substantielle. Celui-ci permet non seulement de reviser 
!'aspect procedural de la legislation, mais egalement de reviser le merite de 
celle-ci. Cette capacite de participer dans ce que !'on considere comme le 
domaine exclusif de la branche legislative fut critiquee vivement. Les cours de 
justice ont toutefais ignore ces opposants et utilise la revision substantielle. Les 
developpements ont he timide mais neanmoins important. Si !es cours 
continuent a utiliser et a augmenter la portee de la revision substantielle, 
!'article 7 deviendra le fandement de nouveaux droits qui permettront au 
Canada de devenir ime societe egalitaire veritable. 
t B.S.c., B.A. (Dalhousie), Ph.D. (L.S.E), LL.B. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). 
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The British North America Act planted in Canada a living 
tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural 
limits. 
Lord Sankey, Edwardsv. A.G. Canada 1 
An explosion of new rights within the Charter 2 will eventually oc-
cur in Canada. Canadians will see, at some point, a Supreme Court 
of Canada cast in the mold of interventionist courts such as the 
United States' Burger and Warren Courts or even some variation on 
the Lochner era. A Supreme Court of Canada with such dynamics 
will push aside deference to Parliament and provincial legislatures 
and challenge the merits of government action. When this con-
frontation occurs, hopefully it will be a progressive Court whose ac-
tions broaden the base of rights protected by the Charter. In this 
expansion of rights, it will be critical that the Court recognizes the 
rights of groups who to date have been left out of the Canadian ex-
perience, such as the poor or various cultural minorities. 
Section 7 of the Charter will most likely be the source for this 
burst of new rights. Section 7 guarantees that: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
[emphasis added]. 
It will be in defining "fundamental justice" that the Court will have 
the ability to question and reject the policy of government action as 
contrary to protected rights. This examination of the purpose or 
merits of the legislation is known as substantive review. Conversely, 
when the court restricts its examination to the implementation or 
the means of the legislation, then the court is conducting a proce-
dural review. A court which engages in substantive reviews tends to 
be highly interventionist in government policy, as seen with the 
United States Supreme Court during various periods of its history.3 
1 Edwardsv. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136. 
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the CanandaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
3 The United States Supreme Court use of substantive review exists in case law 
from the 1870s to the 1970s. The most famous use in recent times is Roev. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 3 5 L. Ed. (2d) 147 (1973), when the Court struck down a 
prohibition on abortions. In terms of specific eras, the Court's intervention was 
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada opened the door for 
substantive review through its decision in Reference re Section 94(2) 
of the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B. C.4 The Court held that fun-
damental justice, as defined in section 7, included both procedural 
and substantive review. Following this ruling, the courts mainly have 
shied away from utilising substantive reviews and have chosen, for 
the most part to restrict themselves to procedural review. Their 
discomfort with substantive review is evident in examining the cases 
on section 7. 
As of March 1993, over one thousand cases on section 7 have 
been heard in Canada. The Ontarian courts have dealt with the 
largest number of section 7 challenges.5 The Supreme Court of 
Canada has engaged in a significant substantive review in only five 
of these cases.6 The courts' limited use of substantive review has not 
initiated supporters of this type of review to demand more; indeed 
felt most keenly during the Lochner era from 1905 to 1930. During these three 
decades, the Court rejected the attempts of government to regulate industry. The 
Court used substantive review to defend laissez-faire economics. The Lochner era 
is so named for the first case in 1905 which commenced the interventionist role 
of the Court. In Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), legislation prescribing 
maximum hours of work in bakeries was nullified. This trend of intervention 
continued as the Court nullified: minimum wages for women, Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); and, fixing the weight of loaves of 
bread, jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924). See: Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726 (1963) which listed examples of laws nullified through the due 
process clause; and, T. C. Marks, Jr., and M. Greenwood, "The Burger Court and 
Substantive Rights, An Analytical Approach" (1980) 57 J. Urban Law 751. 
4 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B. C. 1979, c. 288, as 
amended by the Motor Vehicle Amendment Act 1982, 1982 (B.C.), c. 36., [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter B. C. Motor Vehicle]. 
5 These statistics are drawn from the Quicklaw database "Charter of Rights 
cases" (CRC). The CRC database is a summary of Charter decisions which have 
been compiled since 1982 at the University of Alberta. These statistics are up to 
date as of 31 March 1993. Charter litigation is more dominant in some 
provinces than others and this statistic is not solely on a population basis. Ontario 
litigated 235 section 7 challenges which represented almost 25% of all the cases. 
British Columbia came second with 157 cases or 15% of the cases. Saskatchewan 
came third with 103 cases or 10% of the cases. These three provinces were 
responsible for almost 50% of all section 7 challenges. See Appendix III. 
6 B. C. Motor Vehicle, supra at note 4; Singh v. Minister of Employment and 
Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter Singh]; R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler]; R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 
[hereinafter Vaillancourt]; and, R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 [hereinafter 
Martineau]. 
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this development, however nascent, has drawn the attention of 
critics. The critical response has been forceful, articulate and per-
suasive in arguing for a narrow form of substantive review. Without 
vocal supporters for substantive review, the critics have set the 
agenda for issues surrounding substantive review. 
The study that follows seeks to gauge the future scope of sub-
stantive review. This end will be reached by examining: the history 
of the drafting of section 7, the meaning of substantive review al-
ready given in case law, an assessment of the critics interpretative 
theory, and, a prediction of future decisions. It will be seen that the 
youth of the Charter means that much more must be done before a 
meaningful conclusion can be drawn. Substantive review remains an 
open question. In keeping with the liberal interpretation of the 
Charter which the Supreme Court advocates,7 the potential of sub-
stantive review appears to lie more in an expansive interpretation, 
and as such it lends itself to being a source of new rights. 
THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF SECTION 7 
The Charter went through seven different versions before being fi-
nalized. 8 Remarkably, section 7 was rewritten only once, but the 
changes made were dramatic. Section Ts original version9 provided 
that: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except by 
due proccess of law [emphasis added]. IO 
During hearings in January 1981, the Special Joint Committee of 
the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada 
replaced due process with fundamental justice.II The Committee 
executed this change with minimal considerations. 
7 R. v. BigM Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1S.C.R.295. 
8 The dates of the various drafts are: 22 August 1980; 5 October 1980; 12 
January 1981; 13 February 1981; 24 April 1981; 18 November 1981 and 2 
December 1981. See R. Elliot, "Interpreting the Charter-Use of Earlier 
Versions As An Aid" [1982] U.B.C. L. Rev. 11 Charter Ed. 13at13-16. 
9 In the first draft, section 7 was actually numbered as section 6. Ibid at 30. 
10 Ibid 
I I Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of 
the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, No. 40, 27 
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It is often said that the most important time of a meeting is the 
final minutes. It is during this period that substantial change is pro-
posed and often adopted. This general maxim is applicable to 
changes in section 7. In January 1981, the Special Joint Committee 
devoted three days to the examination of section 7. The debate was 
devoted almost exclusively to whether "enjoyment of property" 
should be included among the rights enumerated. The language of 
due process was scrutinized and changed only in the last hour of the 
debate. 12 
Changes in section 7 were primarily done at the instigation of 
the federal Department of Justice. Several lawyers from the 
Department of Justice argued the necessity of limiting section 7 to 
procedural review. It was the presentation by Mr. Barry Strayer, the 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Law in the Department of 
Justice, which seemed to persuade the Committee. 
Speaking for the Department of Justice, Mr. Strayer told the 
Committee: 
[l]t is our belief that the words 'fundamental justice' 
would cover the same thing as what is called procedural 
due process, that is the meaning of due process in relation 
to requiring fair procedure. However, it in our view does 
not cover the concept of what is called substantive due 
process, which would impose substantive requirements as 
to the policy of the law in question .... 13 
Mr. Svend Robinson, M.P. suggested that fundamental justice 
might have a component of substantive review as well as procedural 
review. Mr. Fred Jordan, Senior Counsel, Public Law, Department 
ofJustice rebuked this suggestion. Mr. Jordan maintained that there 
was no distinction between the principles of fundamental justice and 
the rules of natural justice. 14 During an exchange with The 
Honourable David Crombie, M.P., Mr. Strayer supported Mr. 
Jordan's assertions. 
Mr. Crombie: Natural justice and fundamental justice do 
not deal with substantive matters, only procedural fair-
January 1981. See also J. D. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and 
Application of Section 7 of the Charter' (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 455 at 457-462. 
12 Ibid at 458. 
l3 Minutes of Proceedings, supra note 11 at 46:32. See also Whyte, ibid at 458. 
14 Minutes of Proceedings, ibid. at 46:33. See also Whyte, ibid. at 458. 
40 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
ness, that is the difference between those two and due 
process? 
Mr. Strayer: Yes. 15 
Testimony given at the proceedings suggests that the firm belief 
regarding the meaning of fundamental justice came from the courts' 
interpretations in the Canadian Bill of Rights. 16 The phrase 
"fundamental justice" is found in section 2(e) of this Act. Section 
2(e) provides that no law of Canada shall: 
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accor-
dance with the principles of fundamental justice for the 
determination of his rights and obligations [emphasis 
added]. 
The Committee's attention was drawn to the ruling by Fateux, C.J. 
in Duke v. The Queen17 on section 2(e). Fateux, C.J. held that the 
section required that a 
tribunal which adjudicates upon [a person's] rights must 
act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial 
temper, and must give to him the opportunity adequately 
to state his case. 18 
Fundamental justice, in other words, meant in accordance with the 
laws of natural justice. 
The context of the Charter presented at least one difficulty in 
transposing the meaning of fundamental justice as found in Canadian 
Bill of Rights to the Charter. Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights supplied context to its principles of fundamental justice 
through specific language such as "fair hearing." Similar language 
did not exist in section 7. This issue of differing contexts did not 
come up at the Committee's hearing. The Committee accepted the 
testimony and accordingly removed due process and inserted 
fundamental justice. With this adjustment, section 7 was now in its 
final form. 
The Committee's desires cannot be denied. It wanted only pro-
cedural review in section 7 and the lawyers from the Department of 
Justice appeared to provide the means. In retrospect, it remains re-
15 Ibid at 46:42. 
16 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III. 
17 Dukev. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 917. 
18 Ibid. at 923. 
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grettable that if the Committee knew what it wished that it had not 
sought more advice. This wisdom comes with hindsight. History 
offers many examples of monumental political decisions occurring 
rapidly and with minimal scrutiny. These examples, however 
prevalent in history, do not soften the shattering blow of the haste 
with which the Committee disposed of this matter. This haste ex-
acted its cost in B.C. Motor Vehicle. 19 
ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7 
B. C. Motor Vehicle set out how to come within the meaning of sec-
tion 7 and the scope of judicial review therein. A three-part test 
must be satisfied before the court will find a violation of section 
7.2° First, the plaintiff must show that government action infringes 
life or liberty or security to the person.21 Second, the plaintiff must 
show that the violation of her right was not in accordance with 
principles of fundamental justice. Third, the onus shifts to the gov-
ernment to show that the infringement is justified pursuant to sec-
tion 1. 
The court will determine whether fundamental justice has been 
followed by using the test set out by Lamer, J, as he then was, in 
B. C. Motor Vehicle. 
All [ss. 7-14] have been recognized ... as essential ele-
ments of a system for the administration of justice which 
is founded upon the belief in dignity and the worth of the 
human person. Consequently, the principles of fun-
damental justice are to be found in the basic tenets and 
principles not only of our judicial process, but also of the 
other components of our legal system [emphasis added]. 22 
19 Supra note 4. 
20 It is assumed here that the plaintiff has established the involvement of a 
government actor, thereby satisfying the threshold of s. 32 of the Charter. 
21 The early jurisprudence shows confusion as to whether life, liberty or 
security to the person was read as a single right or as three distinct rights. 
Marceau, J. of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada v. Operation Dismantle, 
[1983] 1 F.C. 745 at 772-775 held that section 7 protected one right. Wilson, J., 
however, expressed the contrary view in Singh, supra note 6 at 204. Wilson, J. 
found three distinct rights in section 7. Her view was confirmed by Lamer, J. in 
B.C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 500 and by Dickson, C.J. in Morgentaler, supra 
note 6 at45. 
22 B. C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 512. 
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This test, Lamer, J. held, includes procedural and substantive re-
views.23 This finding rejected the Special Committee's desire to 
have only procedural review. Enabling the courts to conduct both 
procedural and substantive reviews broadens significantly their 
powers; they are no longer restricted to the implementation of 
legislation but now can review the purpose of the legislation. The 
courts' new breadth of power comes through best in an illustration. 
Assume that Nova Scotia's Motor Vehicle Act has a section which 
states: 
Everyone who drives recklessly is guilty of a summary 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years. 
A plaintiff has been charged under this section for driving through a 
red light. This plaintiff wants to challenge this section using section 
7. The court in a procedural review could strike down the section as 
being too vague or overly broad. Under this review, the court does 
not address the social policy of keeping reckless drivers off the 
road, but determines if the legislative means conform to natural 
justice. If, however, the court bases its review on the merits of pre-
venting reckless driving it then would be conducting a substantive 
review of the legislation. 
Most courts have not taken advantage of the extensive powers of 
substantive review. A large part of the court's hesitation no doubt 
rests with Lamer, J.'s test of "basic tenets of the legal system," 
which is broad and vague. Lamer, J. acknowledged the imprecise 
nature of his test: 
Consequently, those words [fundamental justice] cannot 
be given any exhaustive content or simple enumerative 
definition, but will take on concrete meaning as the courts 
address alleged violations. 24 
This broad test is perhaps a little too daunting and confusing for 
most courts to use in giving meaning to fundamental justice. Even 
the Supreme Court of Canada is not immune from confusion. In an 
attempt to define the "basic tenets of the legal system," five justices 
of the Supreme Court of Canada gave five different opinions in 
23 Ibid. at 497. 
24 Ibid. at 513. 
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Thomson Newspapers v. Canada.25 It cannot be particularly enticing 
to lower courts to apply this test to new areas when clearly the 
Supreme Court of Canada appears at a loss as to how it functions. 
UNDERSTANDING THE PRE-DOMINANCE 
OF PROCEDURAL REVIEW 
The courts employ almost exclusively a procedural review because 
this form of judicial review has existed long before the Charter was 
enacted. Common law, through the principles of natural justice, has 
long employed procedural review to ensure a fair hearing. 26 This 
review has included protection against the bias of decision-makers, 
the ability to defend, and the right to know reasons of the decision. 
The language in sections 8-14 of the Charter are in most regards a 
codification of the common law principles of natural justice. 
Among the specific protection these sections afford are: protection 
against search and seizure without authority (s. 8); protection against 
arbitrary detention or imprisonment (s. 9); protection against arrest 
or detention without knowing the reasons (s. 10); guarantee of habeas 
corpus (s. 10); presumption of innocence (s. l l(d)); protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment (s. 12); and, protection against 
self-incrimination (s. 13). The nature of these sections relate 
primarily to arrest and trial procedures, so it is not surprising that 
criminal law represents 60% of section 7 challenges.27 
The protections in sections 8-14 are ones whose applications 
courts can quickly grasp and thus do use them with ease. When, 
therefore, Lamer, J. held that sections 8-14 are "illustrative, but not 
exclusively so,"28 of the protection found in fundamental justice, it 
is hardly surprising that the courts focussed on the "illustrative" in 
using sections 8-14 as interpretative tools of fundamental justice. 
The courts' embracing of sections 8-14, as the guide, has resulted in 
giving fundamental justice an almost exclusive procedural review 
flavour. The second portion in Lamer, J's statement, that funda-
25 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] I S.C.R. 425. 
26 Administrative law, which has become extremely active in the last few 
decades, has contributed much to defining and broad application of natural 
justice. 
27 See Appendix I. 
28 B. C Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 502-503 per Lamer, J. 
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mental principles have meaning beyond sections 8-14, remains 
largely uncharted waters for the courts. The scope of substantive 
review will rest on how the courts eventually navigate their way in 
these new waters. 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
The real challenge of defining substantive review within fundamen-
tal justice has been, as seen above, avoided by the courts. This being 
said, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, have not 
been completely unwilling to conduct substantive reviews. Since 
1985, the Supreme Court of Canada has rendered five key decisions 
on substantive review. 29 These five cases divide into two distinct 
groups. In two of these case, R. v. Vaillancourt3° and R. v. Mar-
tineau,31 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a front-door 
approach to substantive review. The Court rejected Parliament's 
policy on categorization of certain types of murder. In the remain-
ing three cases, Singh,32 B. C. Motor Vehicles,33 and Morgentaler,34 the 
Court took a back-door approach to substantive review. These cases 
are accepted as instances in which the Court engaged in procedural 
review. The concerns of the Court in these instances, however, were 
far more than procedural as the Court was striking down legislative 
policy. Elements of substantive review, in varying degrees, are 
found in these cases under the guise of procedural review. All five 
cases will now be examined briefly in turn. 
In Vaillancourt35 and Martineau,36 the Supreme Court of Canada 
used substantive review in examining the section in the Criminal 
Code on felony-murder (sometimes called the constructive murder 
rule)37 and found it violated fundamental justice. The striking down 
29 The Supreme Court of Canada has considered section 7 on sixty-two 
occasions since 1982. Source: Quicklaw database of Supreme Court of Canada. 
30 Supra note 6. 
31 Supra note 6. 
32 Supra note 6. 
33 Supra note 4. 
34 Supra note 6. 
35 Supra note 6. 
36 Supra note 6. 
37 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 21(2). 
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of felony-murder as a type of murder in the Criminal Code 
occurred in two stages. The first stage occurred in Vaillancourt. The 
accused was charged with a felony-murder. Under the section, an 
accused who caused death while involved in certain serious offences, 
such as robbery, while armed with a weapon, was guilty of murder. 
This section required no mens rea for murder, only the proof of the 
felony. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
felony-murder provision was unconstitutional because it lacked a 
mens rea requirement for murder. It was held that the extreme 
stigma of murder and the severe punishment involved meant some 
form of mens rea was required to satisfy fundamental justice. The 
Court left unanswered whether the mens rea should be objective or 
subjective. The Martineau decision answered this question. The 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held subjective mens rea 
was required. This ruling struck down felony-murder as a type of 
murder. The Supreme Court of Canada in direct opposition to the 
policy of the Parliament struck down felony-murder as a type of 
murder. L'Heureux-Dube, J., in dissent, wrote that the setting of 
policy as to which acts constituted murder was a policy of 
Parliament not to be interfered with by the courts. She wrote further 
of the contradictions she found in the majority's decision. 
Principles of fundamental justice were supposed to be found in the 
basic tenets of the legal system. L'Heureux-Dube, J. could find no 
other system based on inherited English principles of criminal law 
that set subjective foresight as the exclusive standard of murder. 
L'Heureux-Dube, J.'s observations show just how far the Supreme 
Court of Canada was prepared to reach into policy matters. 
The Supreme Court of Canada's willingness to explore the 
merits of policy is not always done in a forthcoming manner. A 
back-door approach was taken in the next three cases. 
The first of the these three cases on substantive review under the 
guise of procedural review is Singh. 38 This case is not only the ear-
liest decision, but also the one where the focus was most firmly on 
procedural review. Within the Court's decision, however, are ele-
ments of substantive review. The presence of substantive review is 
subtle. In the successive cases of B. C. Motor Vehicle and 
Morgentaler, however, substantive review transforms itself into a 
dominant voice. 
38 Supra note 6. 
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Singh involved a challenge to the Immigration Act 39 and the 
procedures followed in determining refugee status. Refugee status 
was determined by the Minister upon the recommendation by the 
Refugee Status Advisory Committee. An appeal of the Minister's 
decision could be made in writing to the Immigration Appeal 
Board. All six justices who participated in the judgment found the 
appeal process inadequate. They held that any illegal immigrant 
claiming refugee status had the right to appear before the Appeal 
Board. The justices differed in giving legal support to this finding. 
Three justices based their findings on section 2(e) of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights.40 Writing on behalf of the remaining justices, Wilson, 
J. found the lack of appeal in the procedures violated fundamental 
justice. 
The argument can be made that Wilson, J.'s review was solely 
procedural in nature as she addressed the requirements of a fair 
hearing. Traces of a substantive review of the procedures, can, how-
ever, be found in her decision. The Canadian Government made 
representations that these procedures were a policy choice made on 
the need for an efficient system and monetary constraints. Wilson, J. 
rejected these arguments as inadmissable. In effect, then, Wilson, J. 
told the federal government what institutional structure was re-
quired whether it could be afforded or not. It could be argued that 
Wislon, J.'s review, while broader than traditional procedural re-
views, illustrates that procedural matters can have significant, and 
substantial effects. Moreover, though the Court may have adopted 
an activist's position, in some regards, it was all done within the 
ambit of procedural review. Perhaps procedural review has come to 
intrude on policy. This development, however, is a change. 
Although procedural matters largely precipatated this change, the 
subtle presence of substantive issues cannot be overlooked. 
The next case which incorporates a substantive element in the 
procedural review was B. C. Motor Vehicle. 41 This case involved a 
challenge of a section in the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act.42 
This section made it an offence to drive while prohibited or while 
39 1976, s.c. 1976-77, c. 52. 
40 Supra note 16. 
41 Supra note 4. 
42 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288, as am. by the Motor Vehicle Amendment Act 1982, S.B.C. 
1982, c. 36. 
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under suspension and set a minimum penalty of imprisonment. The 
Supreme Court found the section created an absolute liability 
against person who may or may not know of the prohibition or sus-
pension. This lack of culpability coupled with a prison term was 
found to violate fundamental justice. The Supreme Court's action 
seems, at first, to be a procedural review. The decision, it could be 
argued, was concerned with the implementation of the legislation, 
not its merits. The Supreme Court did not, after all, say the 
legislature could not in certain circumstances ban driving. A strong 
presence of substantive review is found, however, in this decision; the 
Supreme Court interfered with a policy choice of the legislature re-
garding sanctions. The legislature exercised a choice in dealing 
with a social issue and the Court rejected its choice. 
Morgentaler43 is the most dramatic example of the Supreme 
Court broadening the definition of procedural review in order to 
review the substantive part of legislation. This case involved a chal-
lenge to a section in the Criminal Cod&4 which made abortions il-
legal unless performed in an accredited hospital with the approval 
of the hospital's therapeutic abortion committee. The hospital 
committee could only approve an abortion to preserve the life or 
health of the woman. Parliament's goal was to limit the circum-
stances in which women could have abortions. The majority of the 
Court found that this section violated the principles of fundamental 
justice. Wilson, J., however, was alone in striking down the section 
on substantive grounds. She held the restrictions on abortions were 
unconstitutional. The remainder of the majority justices were less 
forthcoming. They found a violation of fundamental principles of-
ficially on procedural grounds. They held that the procedures of the 
therapeutic abortion committee could delay or deny an abortion. If 
these justices had restricted their comments to how the committee 
conducted itself, then perhaps it could pass as a genuine procedural 
review; however, they took objection with Parliament's overall 
scheme to restrict abortions. It is this broader rejection of the 
Parliamentary scheme which moved the Court into striking down 
policy and therefore striking down legislation on substantive 
grounds. 
In all of the above cases, the Supreme Court of Canada re-
viewed legislation on its merits in varying degrees. The Court's in-
43 Supra note 6. 
44 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251. 
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trusions into the legislature's policy powers were not severe, but 
they were sufficient enough to suggest how future ventures into 
policy could be far bolder as the judiciary gives fuller meaning to 
substantive review. It is this very potential for fuller review which 
has brought out the critics of broad substantive review. 
CRITICS OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
Critics against a broad substantive review within fundamental jus-
tice have many well-respected legal writers in their ranks as Peter 
Hogg, J. M. Evans, and Eric Colvin. Concern arose because of the 
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in B. C. Motor Vehicle.45 
Decisions such as Morgentalel'6 have heightened these apprehensions. 
The prevalent anxiety about substantive review is that the judiciary 
will review the social and economic policies in government action; 
such broad review would mean the end of deference to the 
legislature. These concerns are based on the actions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States during various periods of time, but none 
more so than the Lochner era, 1905-1937. 
The Lochner era in the United States is so named for the first 
decision which set the pattern of decisions for the next three 
decades. In Lochner v. New York, 47 the Supreme Court of the 
United States used substantive due process to strike down a law that 
limited the hours of work in bakeries. Over the course of the next 
thirty years, the Court applied substantive due process to strike 
down state and federal laws that set maximum hours of work, 
minimum wages, health and safety, standards and protection of 
union activity.48 In 1937, these decisions were overruled, but the 
Supreme Court's disregard for government policy left a lingering 
concern about the power of courts with substantive review authority. 
It was this worry that motivated the replacement of due process 
with fundamental justice in section 7.49 
45 Supra note 4. 
46 Supra note 6. 
47 (1905) 198 U.S. 45. 
48 Supra note 3 for a full discussion of this era. See also: J.E. Nowak and R. D. 
Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (St. Paul: West Pub., 1991) at 351-451. 
49 Supra note 8 at 4-9 for the history of the drafting of section 7. 
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Critics of substantive review want to ensure no Canadian equiva-
lent of the Lochner era occurs.50 Only Eric Colvin, however, has put 
forward a theory as to how substantive review must be interpreted to 
prevent a Canadian Lochner era.5 1 His theory has found support 
among such respected legal scholars as Peter Hogg,52 and it is a 
theory that must be addressed. 
Colvin' s underlying thesis is that: 
Section 7 is concerned with legal means rather than social 
ends, with justice of processes by which social objectives 
are pursued rather than with the justice of the ends which 
are sought. 53 
Or stated more bluntly, Colvin holds there is 
no support for the broad view that section 7 permits ju-
dicial review of the substantive content of law in a sense 
which would cover the social objectives which law em-
bodies.54 
Colvin achieves a restrictive substantive review by arguing that 
section 7 can only be interpreted in light of sections 8-14. The 
courts cannot for the purposes of analyzing section 7 import from 
any other sections of the Charter beyond those of sections 8-14. The 
reason given for this restriction is that fundamental justice in section 
7 covers only legal rights. This limitation is made by the structure 
of the Charter; sections 7-14 are placed together under the heading 
of "Legal Rights." The separate grouping, for Colvin, shows the 
drafters' intent to isolate fundamental justice to legal rights or 
alternatively stated, to limit it to the means. Inherent in this theory 
50 Obsession with the Lochner era is not exclusive to the critics. Most writers on 
fundamental justice make reference to this era. See: P. Garant, "Fundamental 
Rights and Fundamental Justice" in G. A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, eds., The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1989); 
T. Lee "Section 7 of the Charter: An Overview" (1985) 43 (No.2) U.T. Fae. L. 
Rev. 1. 
5 I E. Colvin, "Section Seven Of The Canadian Charter Of Rights And 
Freedoms" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 560. 
52 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 
1992) at 1034-35. Another supporter of Colvin's views is J.M. Evans "The 
Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution and Common Law" (1991) 
29 Osgoode Hall L. J. 51. 
53 Supra note 51 at 561. 
s4 Ibid. at 562. 
50 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
of interpretation is that the courts cannot review with respect either 
to social or economic interests. Colvin believes that Lamer, J. 
supported this approach when he held that sections 8-14 were to be 
"illustrative" of fundamental justice.55 
It is the Morgenta!er56 decision in particular that causes diffi-
culties for Colvin's theory. In Morgenta!er, the Supreme Court of 
Canada's review ventured beyond means into the social ends. In 
order to keep the Court's action consistent with his interpretative 
theory, Colvin resorts to Hart's theory of primary and secondary 
rules.57 
In Hart's theory, the primary rules of a legal system are the ends 
and objectives; these rules set out what a person may or may not do 
in the same spirit of non-legal rules such as morality. Conversely, 
secondary rules are concerned with means; they prescribe how 
various activities are to be conducted to ensure the operation of the 
(primary) rule-system. Thus, as Colvin argues, fundamental justice 
comes under secondary rules because it is concerned with legal 
rights. Separation between the two sets of rules is essential. 
Generally speaking, primary rules would not come under judicial 
scrutiny, but Colvin notes the exception where primary rules set out 
conditions for the secondary rules. Under this exception judicial 
review of primary rules is permissable, and for this reason Colvin 
finds the Morgenta!er decision to be consistent with his theory. 
In Morgenta!er, Colvin writes, only the institutional structure 
was altered by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court attacked 
only the defects in the primary rules that set conditions for sec-
ondary rules; it did not address social or economic interests.5 8 
Colvin's distinction is a fine one; arguably, he has pushed the 
boundaries of Hart's theory to the point of essentially contradicting 
the theory by merging together primary and secondary rules. The 
result is an interpretation theory which fails to account for the 
broader implications on social policy found in the Court's 
decision. 
55 B. C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 502-503. 
56 Supra note 6. 
57 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961) 
at 78-79, 89-96 as referenced in Colvin, supra note 51 at 577. 
58 Colvin, supra note 51at578-579. 
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Colvin' s interpretative doctrine is tenuous in three main ways. 
First, his restriction to sections 8-14 as guidance for section 7 are 
completely contrary to the purposive approach of the Charter advo-
cated by the Supreme Court of Canada. Also, Colvin emphasises 
that Lamer, J. stated sections 8-14 must be illustrative of the prin-
ciples of fundamental justice. Lamer, J., however, left the future in-
terpretation of section 7 more open. Examining the challenges to 
date, it is clear that pressure is being placed on the court to use 
Charter sections beyond sections 8-14 in interpreting fundamental 
justice. In civil cases, section 7 was argued with sections beyond 
sections 8-14 in 34% of the challenges. In criminal cases, other sec-
tions were utilised in only 15% of the challenges. A trend exists, 
nonetheless, to give section 7 a fuller meaning by going outside 
sections 8-14.59 Second, even if interpretation was restricted to il-
lustrations from sections 8-14, Colvin concedes that primary and 
secondary rules are not isolated from each other. Where he purports 
the intrusion into primary rules to be exceptional it could equally 
be viewed as the thin wedge opening the way for further substantive 
review. This wedge, moreover, has been broadened through such 
clear assaults on government social policy as seen in Vaillancourt and 
Martineau. Third, Colvin drafted his theory only four years after 
B. C. Motor Vehicle. The Court in that period had changed little and 
it was quite deferential to the parliamentary tradition. Yet, even 
with the outwardly conservative Court amazing advances were made 
in substantive review. The trend in the Court is toward a broader 
meaning of substantive review. Colvin's interpretative theory 
probably will not withstand the test of time. Even Peter Hogg can 
only hope that Calvin's link between section 7 and sections 8-14, 
"however implausible for other interpretative purposes, may help to 
shield social and economic legislation from judicial review under 
section 7."60 In the end, though, Hogg concludes the extent of 
substantive review remains an unanswered question.61 
59 Although both criminal and civil are using sections beyond those under 
Legal Rights, sections 8-14 continue to dominate in defining fundamental 
justice. Sections 8-14 were used in conjunction with section 7 the majority of the 
times in criminal (65%) and civil (46%). Section 7 also is gaining sufficient 
meaning to stand on its on. In both criminal and civil section 7 was used on its 
own in 20% of the challenges. See Appendices II and IV. 
60 Hogg, supra note 52 at 1035. 
61 Ibid. 
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THE FUTURE OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
Supporters of narrow substantive review are losing the battle. As 
seen in Morgentaler, the Supreme Court of Canada engaged in 
broad substantive review and likely will continue to do so. The 
question which remains unanswered, though, is how broadly the 
Court will apply substantive review to legislation. 
Predicting how the Supreme Court will shape substantive review 
is difficult. The short supply of case law makes this hard to 
forecast. One indicator may be the Lochner era, but realistically 
this judicial review will be distinctly Canadian. Distinctly 
Canadian means that the Court probably will not engage in an 
outright head-to-head confrontation with Parliament or provincial 
legislatures. Initially, the Court will likely conduct most of its 
substantive review under the guise of procedural review. This 
approach has two main advantages. First, it makes it harder for 
critics to discern the precise nature of the review. An example of 
this difficulty is seen with Calvin's conclusion that Morgentaler had 
nothing to do with social review. Second, it casts judicial review in 
a language with which the lower courts are more comfortable. The 
lower courts would then be eased into conducting more substantive 
reviews through this broader procedural review. 
A strong possibility exists that in building a distinctive 
Canadian approach the language of substantive review will never be 
employed. In time, a new phrase for judicial review may emerge 
that describes a procedural review and substantive review all com-
bined in one form. This new phrase would have the advantage of 
breaking free of all the negative connotations that substantive review 
conjures up. The phrase will probably comes as the result of a deci-
sion which sets a specific test, such as the Oakes test62 which is 
applied to section 1. 
The Supreme Court of Canada will have to establish guiding 
principles for interpreting fundamental justice. The form of these 
principles will determine the breadth of judicial review under fun-
damental justice. At the core of these principles will be the Court's 
vision of rights. An individual's legal rights in society do not exist 
exclusive of the rights of others. Each right of a person has two 
components: first, there is the bare or internal right; and second, 
62 The test for section 1 was set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
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there is the external factor, of the rights and responsibilities of oth-
ers. In the context of section 7, the Court must define the rights of 
life, liberty and security on the basis of the bare right together with 
the external factor. 
An individual's bare or internal right is a right in its purest 
state, before it is intruded upon by others' rights. For instance, a 
person has the right to chose a career. Exercising this right, a person 
decides to become a doctor. The external factor includes the 
impact the rights of others have on the bare right and the 
responsibilities and obligations that others owe the bare right. The 
external factor shapes the bare right until the final right is 
established. Frequently the external right shapes the bare right by 
curtailing it through the intrusions of others' rights. The result is the 
diminution of the bare right. A person who wants to be a doctor 
needs the monetary means. If a person cannot access these means, 
because others have exercised their right to accrue wealth, then the 
person's bare right of choice to be a doctor is meaningless. 
The Court must protect the bare right by taking a more ag-
gressive role. Instead of permitting the rights of others to diminish 
a bare right, the Court should impose responsibilities and obliga-
tions on the external factor, these outside rightholders, which pre-
vents the reduction of a bare right. 
The equality envisioned by the Charter requires the Court to 
impose upon the external factor, the Government, the responsibili-
ties and obligations owed to the individual to compensate for the 
diminution of her bare right. Thus, the legal rights of life, liberty 
and security consist of the individual's bare right and the responsi-
bilities and obligations owed by the Government. Government as 
the shaper of society is responsible to correct any harm the individ-
ual's bare right has suffered through society's impact or 
Government's impact. The person, therefore, who has the bare right 
to choose to be a doctor, also has the Government's obligation to 
access the monetary means to be a doctor. Thus, the Court sees the 
individual's choice in this fuller context. 
Fundamental justice in section 7 provides the Court with the 
tool to enforce the obligations and responsibilities that the 
Government owes an individual's bare right in the shaping of an 
individual's legal right. The Court could choose to ignore this 
power and in doing so show deference to Government. The cost of 
this action would be at the expense of the individual's legal right. 
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Conversely, though, the Court may chose to enunciate the obliga-
tions of Government and enforce them. If this path is chosen, then an 
explosion of full and meaningful rights will occur in the Charter, 
and the opportunity to have equality as the state in which all indi-
viduals co-exist in Canada will be greatly enhanced. 
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APPENDIX I 




Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases: 
1982 to 31March1993 
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APPENDIX II 
Overview of Sections Used in Conjunction 
With Section 7 Challenges 
Criminal Civil 
Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases: 
1982 to 31March1993 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Jurisdictional Statistics for Section 7 Challenges 
Jurisdiction L Criminal I Civil Total 
Newfoundland 43 11 54 
Nova Scotia 39 31 70 
P.E.I. 12 9 21 
New Brunswick 16 17 33 
Quebec 24 27 51 
Ontario 131 104 235 
Manitoba 34 42 76 
Saskatchewan 55 48 103 
Alberta 39 46 85 
B.C. 81 76 157 
Yukon 4 7 11 
N.W.T. 9 5 14 I 
Federal Courts I 44 70 114 ::::l 
t::!otals 531 I 493 1024 
Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases: 
1982 to 31March1993 
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APPENDIX IV 








































... T. % of total 
8 0.83 15 2.17 
24 2.48 32 4.63 
1 0.10 5 0.72 
6 0.62 16 2.32 
0 0 7 1.01 
0 0 4 0.58 
0 0 3 0.43 
0 0 8 1.16 
1 9 1.30 
2 11 1.59 
0 0 8 1.16 
0 0 6 0.87 
I 187 19.34 134 19.39 
62 6.41 34 4.92 -
74 7.65 16 2.32 
_J 14 1.45 6 0.87 
53 5.48 28 4.05 
8 0.83 4 0.58 
24 2.48 15 2.17 
42 "'· 30 4.34 
34 3.52 22 3.18 
162 16.75 89 12.88 
13 1.34 3 0.43 
22 2.28 4 0.58 
17 1.76 5 I 0.72 
20 2.07 15 2.17 
11 1.14 2 0.29 
48 4.96 26 3.76 
I 19 1.96 16 2.32 
9 0.93 6 0.87 
89 9.20 96 13.89 
1 0.10 2 0.29 
1 0.10 1 0.14 
3 0.31 6 0.87 
4 0.41 2 0.29 
8 0.83 5 0. 
7 691 
Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases: 
1982 to 31March1993 
